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A REVIEW OF THE FOURTH EXEMPTION OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
T HE FREEDOM of Information Act' was enacted2 in 1966 as a revision
of Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' The purpose of the Act
was "to enable the public to have sufficient information in order to be able,
through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with
respect to the nature, scope and procedure of federal governmental activities."'
The Freedom of Information Act was intended to expand the citizen's
access to government records' and to require federal agencies to make
available to all persons, upon a request for identifiable records, those
documents which are not specifically exempt.'
The United States Supreme Court, in Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink' stated:
Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit
access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public
view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to
secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.'
In short, the policy of the Freedom of Information Act is to encourage
disclosure by government agencies.'
The creation and proliferation of government agencies is considered by
some to be akin to the establishment of a fourth branch of the federal
government. The total manpower and money required of corporations
throughout the United States to satisfy government requests for information
and comply with government regulations is enormous.' Amidst the multi-
15 U.S.C. §552 (1970).
2 The Act was amended in 1967 by Pub. L. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54.
' 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1964).
4 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
5Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC,
339 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D.D.C. 1972).
6 Brockway v. Dep't of Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D. Iowa 1974); rev'd on other
grounds, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975); 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (3) (1970).
7 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
8 Id. at 80.
9 Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 775 (D.D.C. 1974); See S. REP. No.
813, 89 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) ("not a withholding statute but a disclosure statute .....
10 See RUBBER & PLAsTICs NEWS, Dec. 15, 1975, at 3, wherein it is stated:
One example of the inquisition by Federal inspectors is a two-year review [that a major
corporation] has been undergoing with the office of Contract Compliance, of the Depart-
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ude of concerns that corporations have over this continuous outflow of
information, much of which is proprietary, is the concern that confidential
information will fall into the hands of a competitor.
This concern was recognized by the fourth of nine exemptions" under
the Freedom of Information Act. Section 552(b) (4) of the Act states:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential.'
The Senate Report on the Act describes the purpose of exemption 4,
as follows:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information
which is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or other
inquiries, but which would customarily not be released to the public by
the person from whom it was obtained. This would include business
sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes. 1
The House Report contains a broader description of the purpose of Exemption
4:
It exempts such material if it would not customarily be made public by
the person from whom it was obtained by the Government. The
ment of Labor and of the Department of the Interior. The inspectors first formal request
for data after visiting... facilities would have required a one-by-one search of 13,000
personnel records at a cost.., of $62,000 ....
A major corporation "spent more than $30 million... in complying with government
regulations .... Mranslated to the entire country... the compliance cost nationwide figures
out to some $16 billion." WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 17, 1975, at 14, col. 1. "The White
House has placed the cost to consumers of what it calls unnecessary and wasteful regulations
at $130 billion-or $2,000 for every family in the United States." WARw's AuTo WORLD, Nov.
1975, at 15.
11 The emphasis of the Freedom of Information Act is on disclosure, limited only by specific
exemptions which are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 888
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub.
nom., Rosen v. Vaughn, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kriendler v. Dep't of Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366
F. Supp. 929, 936 (D.D.C. 1973), affd as modified, 504 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See also Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424, F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469
(D.D.C. 1972). Ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of disclosure. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.D.C. 1974).
12 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (1970). A corporation comes within the definition of a "person"
under the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. §551(2).
Is S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965) (emphasis added). The fourth exemption
"would also include any commercial, technical, and financial data submitted by an applicant
or a borrower to a lending agency in connection with any loan application or loan." Id.
[Vol. 9:4
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exemption would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer
lists, scientific or manufacturing processes or developments, and negoti-
ation positions or requirements in the case of labor-management
mediations .... It would also include information which is given to an
agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Gov-
ernment. Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good
faith not to disclose documents or information which it receives, it should
be able to honor such obligations.1"
The most extensive analysis of the purpose of Exemption 4 was made
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in National
Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton," which involved the disclosure
of financial information submitted to the National Park Service by companies
operating concessions in the national parks. After examining prior case
authority and Congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history of
the Freedom of Information Act, the court concluded that Exemption 4 had
a dual purpose:" (1) to encourage "cooperation with the Government by
persons having information useful to officials;" and, (2) to protect "persons
who submit financial or commercial data to government agencies from the
competitive disadvantages which would result from its publication."'" The
court of appeals noted that these two distinct purposes, the protection of
legitimate government and private interests, were equally important. The
Court stated that:
[t]he "financial information" exemption recognizes the need of govern-
ment policymakers to have access to commercial and financial data.
Unless persons having necessary information can be assured that it
will remain confidential, they may decline to cooperate with officials and
the ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed de-
cisions will be impaired. This concern finds expression in the legislative
history as well as the case law. 8
The circuit court pointed out in National Parks that the need for
14 H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966). See note 74 infra.
15 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16 Other courts have variously expressed the purpose of Exemption 4. See Rural Housing
Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) ("protecting
the privacy and the competitive position of the citizen who offers information to assist govern-
ment policy makers"); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 775 (D.D.C.
1974) protecting "the rights of suppliers of information"); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339
F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.D.C. 1972).
17 498 F.2d at 768. See also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 295-96
(C.D. Cal. 1974); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 380 F. Supp. 630, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
18 498 F.2d at 767.
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protecting persons who submit financial or commercial data to the govern-
ment from the competitive disadvantage which would result from its disclosure
had been raised several times during hearings19 on the predecessor of the bill
which became law, and that in each of these instances it was suggested that
a "trade secrets" exemption would avert the danger that agencies which had
obtained information pursuant to a statute or regulation would disclose it."°
JURISDICTION
The Freedom of Information Act "grants subject matter jurisdiction to
and empowers the District Court 'to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld'" from the person seeking their disclosure. "1 When the government
refuses to disclose a desired document and a claim for disclosure under the
Act is presented, the burden is on the agency involved to prove de novo in the
trial court that the sought after information is shielded by one of the exemp-
tions to the Freedom of Information Act.2"
[T]he mandate of the Act .... requires the injunctive relief from a
withholding of a given record under the claim of exemption to be
predicated upon the District Court's finding of fact and conclusion of
law as to the merits following a full "de novo" hearing. 2
While the Freedom of Information Act provides a right to de novo court
review for persons who are denied information by a government agency, it
does not confer jurisdiction upon district courts in cases2" where private parties
are seeking to prevent disclosure.2" In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv-
ices Administration,2" the United States District Court for the District of
19 Hearings on S.1666 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,lst Sess. 1-2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S.1666].
20 498 F.2d at 768, citing Hearings on S.1666, supra note 19, at 91, 102, 187.
21 Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392, (9th Cir. 1974).
22 Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub. nom., Rosen v. Vaughn, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Getman v. NLRB 450 F.2d 670,
672 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 505 F.2d 350
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301
F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); 5
U.S.C. §552(a) (3) (1970).
23 Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974).
24 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25 The Freedom of Information Act does apply to a suit seeking to prevent disclosure, so-
called reverse-FOIA suits. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 775
(D.D.C. 1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va.
1974). Contra, Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973).
26 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 9:4
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Columbia held that a corporation seeking to prevent disclosure of informa-
tion which it has submitted to the government is "not within the class of in-
tended beneficiaries of the Act" and, furthermore, that there is no implied
private right of action by persons seeking to prevent disclosure. The district
court decided, however, that jurisdiction to consider the claim of a corpora-
tion seeking to prevent disclosure is conferred by the Administrative Procedure
Act2" in that a decision by a government agency to release data submitted to
the agency by a private party is an "agency action" that adversely affects
that private party and thus entitles that party to judicial review. 8 The Sears
court qualified its decision by pointing out that such judicial review extends
only to information supplied by private parties and extends only up to the
time that disclosure moots the action. 9
COVERAGE
Exemption 4 exempts only (1) trade secrets and (2) information which
is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a person ° and (c) privileged"'
or confidential. 2 Exemption 4 has been construed to require that all of these
27 5 U.S.C. §701 et. seq. (1970).
28 384 F. Supp. at 1001.
29 Id. at 1001n.7.
30 The courts have generally held that Exemption 4 applies only where the information is
obtained from a person "outside" the government agency with that person expressing a desire
that the information remain confidential. See Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D.
Wash. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S.
168 (1975); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). Contra, Brockway
v. Dep't of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975).
81 K. DAvIS, ADMINIsTATIvE LAW TREATISE §3A.20 (1970 Supp.) provides:
[The Senate and House] committee reports... say the fourth exemption "would include
information customarily subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, or lender-borrower
privileges," and the Senate Committee adds "and other such privileges".... The Act's word
"privileged" can hardly be interpreted to exclude what is "privileged" under the doctrine
of executive privilege, even though the committees failed to mention it. (footnote omitted)
See Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D.D.C. 1973). See generally Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (the contents of a communication are privileged if they are of such character that the
law protects them against disclosure as a matter of public policy).
32 See, e.g., Brockway v. Dep't of Air Force 518 F.2d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975); National
Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Brockway v. Dep't of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp.
738, 740 (N.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975); Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 380 F. Supp. 630, 636
(N.D. Ind. 1974); Rabbit v. Dep't of Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1005 (D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d
527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973); Tax Analysts
& Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); K. DAvIS, ADMInmS-
TRATrWE LAw TREATISE §3A.19 (1970) Supp.), But see Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton,
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prescribed elements be present: i.e., the exemption does not apply to infor-
mation which does not satisfy the three requirements in the statute.3 Infor-
mation which is not commercial or financial in nature is not exempted; and,
as pointed out in Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, " "the reach of the exemption for 'trade secrets or
commercial or financial information' is not necessarily coextensive with the
existence of competition in any form." In Washington Research Project, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that research
designs submitted by non-profit educational or medical institutions in grant
applications to the National Institute of Mental Health for studies on the drug
treatment of children with learning difficulties or behavioral disorders were not
exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information
Act. Under the Washington Research Project decision, one may conclude
that the coverage of Exemption 4 is limited to the commercial or industrial
sector and more specifically to profit-making enterprises or persons involved
in the production or marketing of a product or service."
THE ELEMENTS OF EXEMPTION FOUR
A "trade secret" is generally defined as
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may
be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device,
or a list of customers.3
271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967) (Statements of persons given in confidence to the NLRB
in connection with an investigation of unfair labor practices were held to be within the
scope of the exemption.).
33 E.g., Getman, v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F.
Supp. 1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307
(D.D.C. 1973), modified, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d
1363 (2d Cir. 1971). See Brockway v. Dep't of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir.
1975), wherein it is stated:
... the phrase "privileged or confidential" is intended to modify ... the phrase "commer-
cial or financial information" so as to limit the class of commercial or financial informa-
tion which is immune from disclosure to that which is privileged or confidential.
34 504 F.2d 238, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
8 3 Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 936 (D.D.C. 1973), afJdas
modified, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). But see ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIvE
PROCEDURE ACT 34 (1967).
36 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment b (1939). See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422
F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970); Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730, 734
(8th Cir. 1965); Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 221-22, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 658 (1974). See also Central Specialties Co. v. Schaefer, 318 F. Supp. 855, 859
(N.D. I11. 1970) (A trade secret consists of confidential information related to a particular
[Vol. 9:4
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While an invention may be placed in public use or sold without losing
its secret character, a trade secret is something which has not been placed in
the public domain. 7 Matters which are readily and completely disclosed by
the product itself normally cannot constitute a trade secret. 8 A trade secret
may be a process or a device which is patentable; however, novelty and
invention are not essential, and patentability is not a condition precedent to
classifying something as a trade secret.3
In Brockway v. Department of the Air Force," the District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa commented on the intended meaning of the
phrase "commercial ... information" under Exemption 4. The district court
determined that the phrase should be given
a common-sense interpretation consistent with the purpose of the ex-
emption which is to protect the privacy and competitive position of
persons who provide information to assist government decision making
under assurances of confidentiality.'
In National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton" the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a definition of "confidential"
as follows:
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for purposes of the
exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the
following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain
necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to
the competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained.4"
trade or business. Misuse of trade secrets or confidential information constitutes unfair
competition.).
97 Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 226, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 661
(1974).
38 Filter Dynamics International, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 317, 311
N.E.2d 386, 401 (1974).
89See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (5th Cir. 1970); Sinclair v.
Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 222, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1974).
40 370 F. Supp. 738, (N.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.
1975).
41 Id. at 740. "Commercial" is defined by WEBSTER'S TImD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY
(1968) as "related to or dealing with commerce... having profit as the primary aim ......
See Anchorage v. Berry, 145 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D.C. Alaska 1956) ("commercial" defined
as: "of or pertaining to commerce; mercantile;... Having financial profit as the primary aim").
Affirmative Action Programs and EEO-I's have been held to be commercial information obtained
from a person. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1005 (D.D.C. 1974),
stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Brockway v. Dep't of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738,
740-41 (N.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975) (The
court, in a pre-National Parks decision, discusses the possible impairment of the Air Force's
ability to obtain necessary information in the future if disclosure were allowed in that case.).
43 498 F.2d at 770 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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APPLICATION OF THE National Parks TEST
The National Parks test was relied upon by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals in Petkas v. Staats.," The Petkas decision involved
the disclosure, sought by an attorney associated with the Corporate Accounta-
bility Research Group, of disclosure statements 5 filed with the Cost Account-
ing Standards Board by three corporations: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and General Motors
Corporation. The circuit court pointed out, as it did in National Parks, that
a finding that the information sought was of the kind "that would not gen-
erally be made available for public perusal" 8 is not by itself, sufficient to
support application of the financial information exemption. The court con-
cluded that the "district court must also inquire into the possibility that
disclosure will harm legitimate private or governmental interests in secrecy." '
Private and governmental interests are of equal importance under the National
Parks test. Disclosure may be prevented under the exemption even if the gov-
ernment, itself, has no interest in preventing disclosure:
[S]ection 552(b)(4) may be applicable even though the Government
itself has no interest in keeping the information secret. The exemption
may be invoked for the benefit of the person who has provided com-
mercial or financial information if it can be shown that public disclosure
is likely to cause substantial harm to his competitive position. 8
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals summarized and clarified
the tests for confidential information under Exemption 4 in Pacific Architects
and Engineers Incorporated v. Renegotiation Board,9 a case involving the
disclosure of documents containing business sales statistics and business
tax data:
The established tests for determining whether documents are "confi-
dential" business statistics within the meaning of Exemption 4 are that
the statistics must be the sort not customarily disclosed to the public
and that disclosure of the statistics must not be likely to either impair
the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future
44 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
45 The disclosure statements contained cost-accounting principles, methods of distinguishing
direct from indirect costs, and the basis used to allocate costs.
46 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698,
709 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578,
582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1972).
47 501 F.2d at 889, quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765,
770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48 498 F.2d at 770.
49 505 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 9:4
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or cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information is obtained."
The National Parks test was applied in Hughes Aircraft Company v.
Schlesinger5 to the disclosure of Hughes' Affirmative Action Program (AAP).
The Los Angeles Chapter of the National Organization for Women had
requested a copy of Hughes' AAP52 which Hughes, like other defense
contractors, was required to submit to the Labor Department's Office of
Federal Contract Compliance.53 Hughes instituted an action under the
Freedom of Information Act to prevent disclosure.
The governmental interests element of the National Parks test did
not prevent disclosure under the facts of Hughes. The District Court for
the Central Division of California pointed out that the government's ability
to gather such information in the future did not appear to be impaired since
Hughes and other defense contractors are under statutory and regulatory
duties to file specific information in their AAPs5 The court also pointed
out that the government, the intended beneficiary of the policy acknowledged
under the first element of the National Parks test, had not objected to
disclosure in Hughes.
With regard to the private interests element, the court, in addition to
studying the Hughes AAP in camera and requesting that the parties submit
affidavits of experts, looked to Theriault v. United States,55 a decision by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for guidance in resolving the question
of whether disclosure of the Hughes AAP would likely cause substantial
harm to Hughes' competitive position. After noting that the general rule
under the Freedom of Information Act is to allow disclosure unless the
agency involved carries the burden of showing that one of the exemptions
is applicable, the court quoted Theriault:
In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of
50 505 F.2d at 384 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
51 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
52 The AAP had to discuss the minority hiring, firing, and promotion policies of the company
and provide statistical data on previous practices as well as future projections and goals for
minority employment policies. The discussion in the AAP had to be openly self-critical and
fully cover problem areas. 384 F. Supp. at 294.
53 The Code of Federal Regulations required the submission of the AAP. 41 C.F.R. §60-1.40
(1975).
54 See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776-77 (D.D.C. 1974): "Since
the information in question, or most of it, is required by law to be furnished to the Govern-
ment, there is little danger that disclosure will impair the Government's ability to obtain
this data in the future." Neal-Cooper involved the disclosure by the Customs Service of
certain information to the Mexican Government. The information had been filed with the
Customs Service in order to obtain permission to import fertilizer.
55 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Information Act, the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and
nondisclosure, according to traditional equity principles, and determine
the best course to follow in the given circumstances. The effect on the
public is the primary consideration.5"
The Theriault court recognized that "[t]he main spring of the proceedings
under the Act is a judicious weighing of the complainant's need for and
entitlement to production as against the government's or another's right to
protection," 7 and accepted the above quoted language from General Services
Administration v. Benson," a prior decision by the Ninth Circuit, as a guide-
line for such a judicious weighing. 9
The Hughes court considered the experts' affidavits submitted by Hughes
to "lack particularity," pointing out that the factual basis for the con-
clusion that the company would be hurt competitively by disclosure was not
strong and that "[v]ery little in their affidavits specifically points out the
connection between the information contained in the AAP and the alleged
harm that would result from disclosure.""0 The central issue was whether
Hughes' labor costs could be uncovered by a competitor in view of the fact
that the AAP revealed the number of employees at Hughes' Culver City
facility.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dealt with this
same problem in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Schlesinger." While
Westinghouse was decided before National Parks, the first element of the
National Parks test would appear to be of no consequence since both Hughes
and Westinghouse were under statutory and regulatory duties to file specific in-
formation in their respective AAPs and, therefore, the ability of the govern-
ment to gather such information in the future would not appear to be impaired
in either case.
The two courts reached different conclusions, however, concerning the
effect that disclosure of the respective AAPs would likely have on the
competitive position of the respective companies. Professor Rutenberg, who
testified in both Hughes and Westinghouse, concluded that a competitor could
deduce the labor costs of the companies with the assistance of the information
56 384 F. Supp. at 296, quoting Theriault v. United States, 503, F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974),
quoting General Services Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969).
57 503 F.2d at 392.
58 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969).
59 There are conflicting views as to whether or not the Freedom of Information Act permits
a court to balance the equities before ordering the disclosure of information. See notes 110-21
and accompanying text infra.
60 384 F. Supp. at 296.
61 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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contained in the AAP as well as with the Employer Information Report
(EEO-1) in Westinghouse. In Westinghouse, Professor Rutenberg was also
of the opinion that, upon deducing labor costs from the information contained
in the AAP and EEO-1, a competitor could extrapolate a company's profit
margin and resulting vulnerability to price change. Rutenberg's argument
against disclosure was persuasive in Westinghouse, but was rejected in Hughes.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia confirmed
Professor Rutenberg's conclusion in Westinghouse after comparing his
testimony with the EEO-1 and the AAP in question. The District Court
for the Central Division of California, on the other hand, relied in Hughes on
the testimony of government experts to find that the Hughes' AAP was of
"marginal utility.., to a competitor." 2 The government experts had con-
cluded in Hughes that labor costs could only be "imperfectly estimated"
from the information contained in the AAP and would be subject to
"considerable error."" In Westinghouse, such expert testimony was not
presented.
While there were undoubtedly significant factual differences,6" and the
Theriault equitable balancing principle was an overriding factor in Hughes,
a comment is deemed to be in order regarding the debate between Professor
Rutenberg and the government experts. Although there may be instances
in our highly regulated economic system when basic economic principles no
longer effectively operate, the industrial sector is still highly competitive.
Corporations have varying numbers of market and financial specialists who
continually search out fragments of information about competitors and
markets from any available source: published government statistics and
information, various legislative documents, analyses and surveys performed
by consultants, field surveys performed by corporate specialists, information
continually obtained and reported by sales personnel, or disclosures by
government agencies. Since government-derived information is often sub-
mitted according to statutory or regulatory requirement, it is usually more
credible than information from other sources; the latter usually depends
on what a company decides, for its own carefully considered reasons, to make
available. An additional reliable "fragment" of information may be enough to
bring the whole picture into much clearer focus and could conceivably mean
the difference between success or failure in certain contract bidding situations.
62 384 F. Supp. at 298.
63 Id. at 296-97.
6 4 The Westinghouse court carefully pointed out that its decision did not prohibit the disclosure
of "any" of Westinghouse's EEO-1 reports or AAPs, but only encompassed those portions
of the specific documents that the court had the opportunity to examine and had concluded
were shielded by Exemption 4.
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The importance of a court's decision on disclosure in any given case is
magnified by the fact that a number of jobs and possibly the future of a
business may hinge on obtaining a given contract, depending on the in-
dustry involved and a number of other factors.
Of course, where it can be shown that a company voluntarily releases
certain information so that competitors can gain access to it, this consid-
eration is no longer applicable and the Theriault equitable balancing
rationale applied by the Hughes court would appear to be clearly warranted.
The Hughes opinion sets forth a caveat for corporations with regard
to participation in private, industry-wide wage and salary or similar surveys
which involve "an exchange of information with a select sample of companies
in the industry." 5 Namely, a court may consider such a voluntary involvement
in a cooperative survey as "apparent collusion"6 between the company
and its alleged competitors. Such a finding will discredit the company's
claim that its competitive position will be substantially harmed by disclosure,
and will be most persuasive toward the application of the Theriault equitable
balancing practiced in the Ninth Circuit.
Examples of the kinds of factors that might lead to the "substantial
harm to the competitive position" envisioned by National Parks were set forth
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration" with regard
to information that may be contained in Affirmative Action Programs, viz.,
statistical employee breakdowns, plans involving "expansions, reductions, [and]
mergers" and planned "major shifts or changes in ... personnel require-
ments."6 From the Sears opinion, one may conclude that the substance of the
burden to be carried by a corporation seeking to prevent disclosure under
Exemption 4 is to prove that disclosure will allow a company's competitors
to compete more effectively by attaining access to "inside information."
The Sears court pointed out that the fear that disclosure would adversely
affect the goodwill of a corporation was not actionable under the standards
of National Parks.
OBJECTIVE TEST FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
"[Tihe test for confidentiality is an objective one."6 " In their determi-
nation of the existence of confidentiality, the courts rely on the nature of
65 384 F. Supp. at 297. The cooperative survey in Hughes involved data on actual salary
ranges and averages by job classification.
66 Id. at 297-98.
67 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974).
68 Id. at 1007 (footnotes omitted).
69 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1972).
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the material and on the testimony of experts, not on the bare claim of a
corporation seeking to prevent disclosure. 0 The fact that the information
was supplied upon the condition that it remain confidential does not
compel the court to find confidentiality:
Regardless of whether the information was submitted on the express
or implied condition that it be kept confidential, a court should deter-
mine, on an objective basis, that this is not the type of information one
would reveal to its public. 1.
In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service,"' the District
Court for the District of Columbia stated that "[a] bare claim or promise of
confidentiality"7 by an agency cannot defeat the right of disclosure; "[t]o
allow a promise of confidentiality by the agency to control would enable the
agency to render meaningless the statutory scheme"7 of the Freedom of In-
formation Act. The District Court for the Northern District of California, in
addressing this issue in Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Shultz,"'
stated:
[A]dministrative promises of confidentiality cannot extend the command
of the Freedom of Information Act that only matters "specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute" are protected under §552(b) (3)."',
The document involved must be "independently confidential"77 based on
70 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1974).
7: M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. (1972).
72 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part and remanded, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
73 362 F. Supp. at 1307. See also Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
reversing Petkas v. Staats, 364 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1973); Rural Housing Alliance
v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bristol Myers Co.
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467,
471 (D.D.C. 1972). Cf. Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). The House Report on the Freedom of Information Act provides
that "where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documentations
or information which it receives it should be able to honor such obligations," H.R. REP. No.
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess (1966). It has been recognized that the House Report "is char-
acteristically broader and goes beyond the express terms of the statute .... The Senate report
is to be preferred over the House Report as a reliable indication of legislative intent.... ." Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1973), quoting Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1971), In addition, the district court in the
Tax Analysts decision pointed out that legislative history should not outweigh the statutory
language when the former is contradictory or ambiguous. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS,
supra at 1304.
74 362 F. Supp. at 1307n.50.
75 349 F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1972).
76 Id. at 776; cf. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
77Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), quoting Fisher
v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp.
1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973).
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its contents. In Tax Analysts, the District Court for the District of Columbia
defined "independently confidential" to mean that the information is "not
otherwise subject to public disclosure and entitled to a reasonable expectation
of privacy"."8 In order for a document or a portion of a document to be
brought within the protection of Exemption 4, it "must be shown to be in-
dependently confidential and not susceptible to being rendered anonymous""
by suitable deletions.
DELETION
An entire document is not exempt merely because an isolated portion of
the document is shielded by an exemption.8" Deletion of a portion of the doc-
ument before disclosure may be deemed sufficient protection under the statu-
tory exemption. "[T]he exemption... protect[s] ... only that information
which cannot be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion of the filing
party's name and other identifying information."" In Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,2 the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia stated:
Congress did not intend to exempt an entire document simply because
it contained confidential information .... [Tihe proper procedure where
exempted data is contained in the requested document is to accommo-
date the Freedom of Information Act's dual policy of promoting public
awareness and administrative fairness, on the one hand, and the need
for justifiable secrecy on the other, by striking identifying details from
the documents prior to release.8"
It should be noted that the Freedom of Information Act specifically provides
for deletion:
To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes
available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or
staff manual or instruction. However, in each case the justification for
the deletion shall be explained fully in writing. 4
78 362 F. Supp. at 1307 (footnotes omitted). See Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1324
(D.D.C. 1973).
79 362 F. Supp at 1308.
80Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom., Rosen v.
Vaughn, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-94 (1973); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
81 Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), quoting
National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
82 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83 Id. at 711-12. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.D.C. 1970).
84 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2) (1970).
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While several cases favor the deletion of certain protected matter to per-
mit disclosure of the remainder of the document in question,85 some courts
have wisely recognized that deletions may, in certain instances, be ineffective
to protect privacy and confidentiality." In some cases, "the party that filed the
statement is so large or unique that disclosure of the data itself would destroy
the confidentiality of that party ... ."I' Deletion may not ensure anonymity
or change the basic confidential nature of the document; s furthermore, in-
dividuals with knowledge of a particular area may be able to determine the
identity of the persons involved due to inadequate deletion. 9
DETAILED JUSTIFICATION PROCEDURE
In order to hold material exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, the court must both examine the documents in camera to
determine whether the documents, or portions of them, fall within one of the
exemptions and explain the specific statutory justification for withholding
particular information."0
In Vaughn v. Rosen91 and Cuneo v. Schlesinger,9" the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia set forth procedures which will produce the informa-
tion necessary to resolve conflicting claims concerning the applicability of an
exemption. The circuit court found such procedures necessary on two
grounds:
[to] (1) assure that a party's right to information is not submerged.
beneath governmental obfuscation and mischaracterization, and (2)
permit the court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual
nature of the disputed information .... 1
85 See National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Grumman v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
86 E.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1974); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87 See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
88 See Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir.
1970), wherein it is stated:
A request for the orders and opinions concerning a single contractor would clearly create
a problem of confidentiality. In the present case this problem does not exist because
appellant has requested orders and opinions relating to fourteen contractors, and their
release en masse without identifying details will preserve anonymity.
89 See Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78, 79 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
90 M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D.D.C. 1972). See Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). But see
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (pointing out that an in camera examination is not always
necessary with regard to Exemptions 1 and 5).
91484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
93 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
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The circuit court formulated "detailed justification" procedures to prevent an
agency from frustrating the intent of the Freedom of Information Act by
making "conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions."9'
Vaughn suggested a "relatively detailed analysis in manageable seg-
ments";95 however, the particularized and specific justification for exempting
information from disclosure need not contain factual descriptions that, if
made public, would compromise the secret nature of the information. With
regard to Exemption 4, Pacific Architects elaborated the "detailed justifica-
tion" procedure contemplated by Vaughn as follows:
[T]he agency resisting disclosure must present a "detailed justification"
... for application of the exemption to the specific documents in dispute.
Such a "detailed justification" (under the facts of Pacific Architects)
should include
(a.) the extent to which data of the sort in dispute is customarily dis-
closed to the public, with specific factual or evidentiary material to
support the conclusion reached;
(b.) the extent to which disclosure of this information will impair the
government's ability to obtain necessary information of this type in
the future, with specific factual or evidentiary material to support
the conclusion reached;
(c.) the extent to which disclosure of the information will cause sub-
stantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom
the information is obtained, with specific factual or evidentiary
material to support the conclusion reached; and
(d.) the extent to which any harms of the type mentioned in (b.) and
(c.) could be reduced or eliminated by non-disclosure of the
identity of the person submitting the information in dispute.
If it is claimed that the information itself discloses to knowledgeable
people the identity of the person who supplied it, some factual basis for
that conclusion must be advanced to support the (agency's) nondis-
closure.9"
In short, the court requires a detailed statement from the agency stating the
factual and legal basis for the agency's claim of exemption.
The Vaughn procedure also requires the agency to specify in detail both
those portions of the document which may be disclosed and those which are
allegedly exempt. This is to be done through a system of itemizing and index-
ing that correlates statements made in the government's justification for re-
94 484 F.2d at 826.
95 Id.
96 505 F.2d at 385
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fusal with the actual portions of the document in question; i.e., an itemized
explanation by the government is required.
However, as pointed out in Exxon Corporation v. Federal Trade Com-
mission97 by the District Court for the District of Columbia, utilization of the
Vaughn procedure is not mandatory in every case.
Vaughn did not lay down a per se rule to be applied to every Freedom
of Information case. It rather suggested a technique to assist the court
when needed. When there is a "factual dispute regarding whether the
documents actually fit" the description by the government, and when the
government claims multiple exemptions which may apply "to all or only
a part of the information," in documents consisting of "hundreds or even
thousands of pages," then the government must provide more than mere
conclusory allegations with its in camera submission.98
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRETION
The general view is that the exemptions of the Freedom of Information
Act authorize nondisclosure but do not require it.9 Although the Freedom of
Information Act, via its nine exemptions, delineates categories of information
which the government is not required to disclose, the Act, by its own terms,
does not bar voluntary disclosure by the government of information in those
categories. 00 This view is reinforced by the following statement from the
introduction to a committee print on the Freedom of Information Act pre-
pared by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
It should be emphasized that the exemptions in the FOIA were not in-
tended by Congress to be used either to prohibit disclosure of informa-
tion or to justify automatic withholding of information. Rather, they
merely mark the outer limits of information that may be withheld
where the agency makes an affirmative determination that the
public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate that the
information should be withheld. Agencies have been slow to adopt this
97 384 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1974).
98 Id. at 761. The Vaughn procedure was ordered to be used in Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp.
722, 724 (D.D.C. 1974), in order to determine which portions of the documents involved
were privileged under the fourth exemption.
99 See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974).
10 0 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); K. DAvis ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §3A.5 (1970 Supp.).
See also Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), wherein
the court concluded that, the argument that the Act contains no provision forbidding disclosure
"is supported by legislative history of the recently enacted amendments to the FOIA which
make it clear that the Act is not to be interpreted in any way as a restriction on government
disclosure. S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) ...."
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attitude, but enlightened judicial decisions reflect this approach to inter-
preting the force of the FOIA exemptions."'
While the exemptions do not make nondisclosure mandatory, the District
Court for the District of Columbia noted, in Sears, that the "policies behind
those exemptions provide a sound basis for determining whether release of the
documents in question would be 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law. '1 0 2
In Westinghouse Electric the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia rejected the general view that the exemptions represent categories
of information which "may", as a matter of agency discretion, be exempt,
stating that such a view "flies in the face of the protective purpose of the
exemption."'03 The court concluded that "[t]he FOIA cannot permit agency
discretion to the extent that such discretion precludes de novo determination
by a court of the entitlement to an exemption under FOIA."'' °
The Senate Report on the Act arguably supports both views. In explain-
ing what S. 1160 would do, the report states:
It sets up workable standards for what records should and should not be
open to public inspection .... [It] replaces [vague phrases] with specific
and limited types of information that may be withheld. 5
In addition to describing the protective purpose of Exemption 4,16 the Senate
Report, in setting forth the purpose of S. 1160, states:
It is not an easy task to balance opposing interests .... It is not necessary
to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of neces-
sity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies in
providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and pro-
tects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclo-
sure.
10
The position adopted in Sears appears to be in accord with legislative in-
tent. 8
101 SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGIS-
LATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES (Comm. Print 1974).
102 384 F. Supp. at 1001; see notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
103 392 F. Supp. at 1250 (the court based its conclusion on the "protective purpose of the
exemption as enunciated in the Senate and House Reports" and upon the Bristol-Myers
decision. Id.)
104 Id.
105 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1965) (emphasis added).
106 See text (quote from Senate Report) accompanying note 13 supra.
1o S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1965) (emphasis added).
1
0 8 See also Continental Oil Co. v FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975) (Relying on National
Parks, the court rejected the FPC's contention that the FOIA does not command withholding
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There is also disagreement as to whether or not the Freedom of In-
formation Act permits a court to balance the equities before ordering dis-
closure. As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the position that
the Act does permit such a balancing." ' The general view, however, main-
tains that Congress intended both to limit the equitable powers of the court
under the Act and to deny the power to refuse disclosure for any reason other
than specifically covered by the exemptions. 1 '
The general view is based on two grounds: first, on Congress' rejection
of need as a standard for disclosure;11' and, secondly, on its command that
all documents be disclosed except those covered by specific exemptions.'12
of confidential information under Exemption 4. The court thus avoided a determination of the
plaintiff's argument that disclosure would be a taking of proprietary interests in violation of
the fifth amendment.).
109E.g., Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974); GSA v. Benson, 415
F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296
(C.D. Cal. 1974). See Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 36 (5th Cir. 1975) ("necessity
of balancing public and private interests in interpreting the FOIA"). See generally K. DAvIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §3A.19 (1970 Supp.).
110 See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505, F.2d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v.
EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d
657, 662 (6th Cir. 1972); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Rabbit v. Dep't of Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F.Supp. 771,776 (N.D.Cal. 1972). See also Bannercraft Clothing
Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1972), reversed on other grounds,
415 U.S. 1 (1974); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1965 ("It is essential that
agency personnel, and the courts as well, be given definitive guidelines in setting information
policies."). Contra, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration,
301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
(The district court held that the court has equitable jurisdiction to deny disclosure even
where none of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act ar applicable.) However,
in Getman v. NLRB, supra at 678n.25, the District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that the
equitable discretion issue was not briefed or argued before the district court in Consumers
Union, and the appeal was dismissed as moot. The court also indicated that it believed
the Ninth Circuit is in agreement with the District of Columbia Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit in that a court has no equitable discretion when none of the exemptions of the
FOIA are applicable. The Getman court cited 5 U.S.C. §552(c) ("this section does not
authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public,
except as specifically stated in this section.") in concluding that the court has no equitable
discretion. The Getman court also declined to follow Professor Davis' suggestion that the
courts might act to redraft the statute by invoking the equitable discretion doctrine, K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§3A.6, 3A.19 (1970 Supp.), for the reason that invocation
of equitable powers to permit nondisclosure beyond the specific exemptions of the Freedom of
Information Act would seriously undermine the overriding purpose of the Act.
111 E.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
reversed on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792n.6 (6th
Cir. 1972); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1965) ("eliminates the test of who
shall have the right to different information ... the public as a whole has a right to know
what its Government is doing.").
112 Id. The Senate Report speaks directly to the question of statutory purpose: "The purpose
... is to make it clear beyond doubt that all materials of the Government are to be made
available to the public.. . unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the
exemptions .... S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1965).
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While the Ninth Circuit's opinions can be read to hold that the court has
equitable discretion to refuse disclosure for reasons other than specifically
covered by the exemptions, it appears that the Ninth Circuit made a more
limited holding; viz., in determining whether an exemption under the FOIA is
applicable, the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure on
the public interest in accordance with traditional equity principles." 3
The Ninth Circuit's view11 is arguably supported by certain language
in the Senate Report." 5 The FOIA gave the courts definitive guidelines in
setting information policies, and these "guidelines""'  or "workable stand-
ards""' for what records should and should not be open to public inspection
were delineated in terms of specific and limited types of information that
may be withheld. However, Congress recognized the necessity of protecting
equally important rights and that these opposing interests must be balanced.
In delineating the exemptions, Congress attempted to provide "a workable
formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure."'
Exercise of equity powers in the context of the Ninth Circuit's limited
holding would appear to be necessary to achieve "responsible" disclosure. It
is not in the public interest to undermine competition by disclosing information
that companies have traditionally attempted to keep from the sight
and knowledge of either competitors" 9 or the public. Loss of goodwill can be
'IsSee Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
328 (1944).
"4 Support for the Ninth Circuit's view might also be inferred from the absence of clear
Congressional intent regarding equitable powers: "[I]f Congress had intended to make.., a
drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its
purpose would have been made." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
See also Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercroft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974), where it
is provided that:
With the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by §552(a),
there is little to suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit
the inherent powers of an equity court.
115 In addition, the House stated: "The Court will have authority whenever it considers such
action equitable and appropriate to enjoin the agency from withholding its records and to
order the production of agency records improperly withheld." H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1966).
116 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1965).
17 Id.
Ia Id. (emphasis added)
"1
9 The National Parks opinion quoted the following significant language from the Hearings on
S.1666:
[N]ot only as a matter of fairness, but as a matter of right, and as a matter basic to
our free enterprise system, private business information should be afforded appropriate
protection, at least from competitors, 498 F.2d at 769, citing Hearings on S.1666 supra
note 19, at 199.
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just as detrimental to the competitive position of a business as disclosure of
financial data. Goodwill is a term that conveys different meanings to different
individuals. To the accountant, it is an intangible asset, viz., the capitalized
value of expected future excess profits. 120 To the layman it is that intangible
ingredient that means the difference between mediocrity and success and
implies a well-known corporate name, popular acceptance of products, and
outstanding customer relations. 2' Disclosure of any information that can
potentially destroy this intangible ingredient, information that corporations
would customarily not release to the public, would appear to be capable of
causing "substantial harm" to the competitive position of businesses."'
Interference beyond that necessary to protect the public interest would
needlessly jeopardize the efficiency and effectiveness of the free market
system. The Senate Report's statement of the purpose of Exemption 4 in
which the phrase "but which would customarily not be released to the public
by the person from whom it was obtained" was used, would appear to mirror
this concern. In addition, the Senate Report stated in conclusion:
The committee feels this bill, as amended, would establish a much-
needed policy of disclosure, while balancing the necessary interests of
confidentiality.'
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's view on equitable balancing does not appear to be
incompatible with the fact that the Act makes information available to "any
person"'2 4 and the fact that the exemptions are based on the nature of the
information sought, not the status, identity, or need of the particular seeker.
To the extent that "balancing the equities" is construed to encompass
the "need" of the particular seeker, it is misleading terminology in the context
of deciding whether or not to disclose information claimed to be confidential
under Exemption 4. "Balancing the equities" is better viewed as a
balancing of the potential effect on the public interest of nondisclosure
as opposed to disclosure; that is, whether the public interest requires disclosure
See Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D.D.C. 1963) ("Business secrets
should be kept from the sight and knowledge of ... competitors so far as is practicable to do so
in the discharge of the [agency's] responsibilities under the law.").
320 See, e.g., Spheeris v. Spheeris, 37 Wis. 2d 497, 155 N.W. 2d 130, 135 (1967); Securities
Realization Co. v. Peabody & Co., 300 Ill. App. 156, 20 N.E.2d 874, 881 (1939).
121 See, e.g., Barran v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1964); In re Giant's Estate, 57
Wash. 2d 309, 356 P.2d 707, 709 (1960).
122 "Goodwill" is property that may be damaged. See, e.g., Avery v. Lyons, 183 Kan. 611,
331 P.2d 906, 914 (1958).
123 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965).
124 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (3) (1970).
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or public policy requires nondisclosure. There is a presumption under the
Freedom of Information Act that disclosure is in the public interest;
however, where disclosure will harm legitimate private or governmental
interests in secrecy, nondisclosure is clearly warranted not only as a matter
of right, but also as a matter of public policy as expressed in the legislative
history of the Freedom of Information Act and specifically in Exemption 4.
It is a question of the basic inequity of placing before competitors and the
public, on the basis of legislative intent susceptible to conflicting interpreta-
tions, the types of information that corporations traditionally have attempted
to keep from the sight and knowledge of competitors and the public.
Persuasive arguments can be made both for." and against "' the con-
tention that Exemption 4 protects any information which is privileged or
confidential, not just commercial or financial information which is privileged
or confidential.
One factor which seems to have received little attention in analyzing the
purpose of Exemption 4 is that the mischief which Congress was attempting
to remedy was the arbitrary and self-serving withholding, by agencies which
are not directly responsible to the people, of official information on how the
government is operating through the use of vague phraseology in Section 3
of the Administrative Procedure Act. The purpose of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act was to protect the people's right to obtain information about
their government, to know what their government is doing, and to obtain
information about government activities and policies."' The Freedom of
Information Act was not enacted for the purpose of enabling the public to
obtain information about individuals and corporations, about what those
individuals and corporations are doing, or about what their activities and
policies are.
Disclosure of any information which corporations have traditionally
kept secret for valid competitive reasons strikes at the heart of the free
enterprise system and was undoubtedly what Congress intended to guard
against when, in expressing the purpose of Exemption 4, it stated:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information
... which would customarily not be released to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained.'28
GARY I. KRUGER
125 See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 32-34 (1967).
126 See, e.g., Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1188-89 (8th Cir. 1975).
127 See generally S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1966). H. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
128 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
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